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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

KEITH HOLBROOK and GENEVE
K. HOLBROOK,
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- vs. EL WOOD S. CARTER and LINDA
N. CARTER,
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10777

J. HENRY EHLERS and NELLIE
J. EHLERS,
Defendants-Appellants.

APPEULANT'S' BRIE1F

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CAS.E
This is an action to quiet title to real property in
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. Respondents
elaim title by adverse possession against the fee title
holders and also against appellants, who hold the tax
titk• to the property as tenants in common with respondents.
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DISPOSI'l1ION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was submitted to the court on an agreed
statement of facts and judgment was entered quieting
title to the property in respondents and against all defendants, jncluding the appellants herein.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The fee title holders have not appealed from the
lower court's decision. This appeal is taken only by the
appellants, as holders of the tax title as tenants in common with respondents, seeking reversal of the court'8
decision in favor of respondents on the grounds that the
stipulated facts and the law do not support the court's
decision. Appellants also seek to have the case remanded
to the lower court for an accounting of the rents and
profits and for partition of the land.
STA'rEMENT OF FACTS (R. 21-23)
On July 1, 1949, Salt Lake County sold to Rennold
Pender, Margaret J. Eliason and J. Henry Ehlers, appellant herein, the tax title to the property involved in
this action, and issued its tax deed conveying the property to these three individuals as tenants in common.
The property involved is located immediately north of
and adjoining the dairy farm of respondents.
At the time they received the tax deed, Rennold
Pender and J. Henry Ehlers orally a.greed between themselves that Pender could use Ehler 's one-third interest
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m tht> property, and as consideration therefor would

pay the taxes on the property as they became due. The
taxes on the property were paid each year thereafter
by PendPr or by respondents. Ehlers from time to time
and each year personally checked the tax records to make
cPrtain that the taxes had been paid.
On .J urn' 11, 1951, Pender conveyed his interest in
thP property to respondents by quitclaim deed and on
June 21, 1961, Margaret J. Eliason conveyed her intere8t in the property to respondents, also by quitclaim
deed. Appellants did not jojn in these deeds, nor have
they conveyed their interest in the property at any other
time.
lnunediately upon receipt of the quitclaim deeds,
respondents went into possession of the property, enclosed it with a fence and made use of it as part of their
dairy farm operation. For three or four years following
June, ] 951, respondents plowed and planted the property
and since that time have used the property for grazing.
No buildings or o.ther improvements were ever construeted on the property. All profits from crops and pasturage were received and retained by respondents. Appellant J. Henry Ehlers was aware of the use made of
the property by respondents and of the fencing and
pPrsonally went through the gates in the fence from time
to time. The public at large has made no use of the
property without the consent of respondents.
Shortly after receiving the quitclaim deeds from
Pender and Eliason, the respondents, through their agent,
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W. Louis Gardner, contacted Ehlers and offered to purchase his interest in the property. Ehlers replied t-0
Gardner that they were not interested in selling.
Appellant J. Henry Ehlers, prior to July 1949, had
acquired tax title to other properties and was generally
aware of the acts required to obtain title by adverse
possession.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ACTS OF RESPONDENTS WERE NOT SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION
AGAINST THEIR CO TEN ANTS.

Pender, Eliason and Ehlers became cotenants of the
property when they purchased the tax title in July 1949.
The quitclaim deeds from Pender and Eliason to respondents placed respondents in the position of their
grantors and they, therefore, became cotenants with
Ehlers. Respondents did not consider themselves as
sole owners of the property and at all times recognized
the interest of Ehlers. Their offer to purchase Ehlers'
interest indicated their knowledge that he was their
cotenant, holding an undivided one-third interest in the
property. Morton v. Morton, 286 s.-w. 2d 702 ('Tex. Civ.
App. 1955).
Respondents claim that they gained title by adverse
possession on the grounds that they were in sole p-0ssession of the property, paid taxes thereon for the statutory seven-year period and also that they fenced, plowed,
1
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planted and grazed the property. rrhese acts may be
sufficient to adverse the fee title holders but are decidedly insufficient to adverse a cotenant. The relationship between cotenants is isuch that the acts necessary
to start the adverse possession statute running against
one and in favor of another must almost amount to actual
ouster.
The nature of this fiduciary relationship between
cotenants is indi,cated by the following quotation from
4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPE,RTY § 1801, at 136
(1961 repl) :
One of the legal consequences that ensues from
the existence of a cotenancy whether a joint tenancy, a tenancy in common, or a tenancy by the
entireties is the existence of a fiduciary relationship of a certain nature between the cotenants....
Its major aspeds are (a) that neither cotenant
can acquire nor hold an interest in the property
that is adverse to the cotenan,cy''s interest without
acquiring it for the benefit of all cotenants; (b)
that no co.tenant can himself hold adversely to the
other cotenants except under stated conditions;
( c) that one cotenant so acquiring an outstanding
adverse interest for the benefit of all is entitled
to contribution from the other cotenants for their
proporti'onate shares and for security therefor;
and ( d) that neither cotenant can place a burden
on nor derive a profit or advantage from the
property without the consent of the others. Eia.ch
has an implied obligation to sustain and protect
the common title ....
And, speaking more sp€cifically to what is required
for one to obtain title by adverse possession against his
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cotenant, the same authority states, in 4 THOMPSON,
REAL PROPERTY ~ 1810, at 204-07 (1961 repl.):
The entry and possession of one tenant in common are presumed not to be adverse to his cotenants. His occupation is pn"sumed to. be in accordance with his right as part owner to the
possession of the whole undivided land.
Until evidence of an actual ouster is shown
the possession of one cotenant is the possession
of all. This is true even where one cotenant conveys his interest to a stranger and the latter
enters into possession. Adverse possession by one
cotenant is possession of all....
A tenant in common in possession is presmned to hold in the right of his cotenants, as
well as himself, until notice is brought home to
them of an intention to disseise them. In order
to rebut this presumption and make such possession adverse it must he shown that the possession
was with the intent to hold adversely and such
intent must be indicated by acts calculated to
exclude the cotenants ....
Several cases have been decided by the Utah Supreme Court involving adverse possession as between
cotenants. Most all o.f them cite the case of McCready v.
Fredericksen, 41 Utah 388, 126 Pac. 316 (1912), as the
one establishing the rule in Utah. The McCready case
states the rule in Utah to be the same as that quoted
therein from Elder v. McClaskey, 70 Fed. 529, 542 (6th
Cir. ____ ):
·where one enters avowedly as tenant in common with others, his possession is the possession
of those others, so long as the tenancy in common
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is not openly disavowed. Before adverse possession by one tenant in common against another can
hegin, the onP in possession must, by acts of the
most open and notorious character, clearly show
to thP world, and to all having occasion to observe
the condition and occupan1cy of the property, that
his possession is intended to exclude, and does
exelude, the rights of his cotenant. It is not necessary for him to give actual notice of this ouster
or disseising of his cotenant to him. He must, in
the language of the authorities, 'bring it home'
to his cotenant. But he may do this by conduct,
the implication of which cannot escape the notice
of the world about him, or of any one, though
not a resident in the neighborhood, who has an
interest in the property, and exercises that degree
of attention in respect to what is his that the
law presumes in every owner.
Th<:' M cCrcady case considered whether the acts of
fencing and planting a plot of ground, together with
payment of taxes for the statutory period, were suffieient to give title by adve.rse possession to one cotenant
against another. The court stated at 41 Utah 39~97:
... it must be remembered that the possession, and even the use, by one cotenant of premises is always presumed to be the possession of
all. Moreover, that any act of his which is calculated to protect the property against a lien, or
salP, or otherwise, will also he presumed to be for
the benefit of his cotenants; and this presumption
prevails until the contrary is clearly made to ap1wa r .... we are clearly of the opinion that under
thP great weight of authority the acts of [the
cotenant in possession] ... were clearly insufficient to constitute an ouster of his ootenant ....
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The earlier case of Smith u. North Canyon Water
Co., 16 Utah 194, 52 Paic. 283 (1898), also indicated the
difficulty one has in adversing his cotenant. In that
case one of the defendants had used water rights and
paid taxes and fees thereon for a number of years, yet
the court held that he had not acquired title to the water
shares by adverse possession, stating at page 200:
The possession of one tenant in common is the
possession of all his cotenants. There is no element of hostility in such possession, and an adverse holding will not operate as an ouster, and
set the statute of limitations running, until the
tenant out of possession has some notice of such
adverse holding. Such possession cannot be considered adverse, unless there is an actual ouster
or some equivalent act showing the intent or act
of exclusion.
Ano ther case involving title to water stock states
in even stronger terms the rn~cessity of an ouster and
repudiation in order to establish title by adverse possession. In that case, Rasmussen v. Sevier Valley Canal
Co., 48 Utah 490, 494, 160 Pac. 444 (1916), water stock
descended to the heirs of the owner as tenants in common but one son took possession of it and for fourteen
years "had the exclusive use of the water, paid all the
taxes and assessments on the stock, voted it at stockholders' meetings, and in so doing was recognized by
the company as the owner. We do not think that is sufficient to establish an outster (sic) and repudiation by
one cotenant against other cotenants."
0
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The more recent ease of Sperry v. Tolley, 114 Utah
312, 199 P.2d 546 (1948), held that the acts of dividing,
fencing, separately using without accounting for profits
or expenses, improving the buildings on the land, and
even the purchasing of a tax title in the name of one
cotenant, were not sufficient to. constitute adverse possession. The court considered all of this as consistent
with possession as a tenant in common, and cited the
McCrcady case as holding "that any act done by a cotenant for the protection of the common property, will be
presumed to be for the benefit of all tenant·s and the
presumption prevails until the contrary is clearly made
to appear." See also Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53,
4-04 P.2d 253, 256 (1965); Webster v. Krwp, 6 Utah 2d
273, 312 P.2d 557, 560 (1957).
The most recent case decided by this court concerning the question of adverse possession against a
cotenant is Heiselt v. Heiselt, 10 Utah 2d 126, 349 P.2d
175 (1960). That case held that the exclusive possession
and payment of taxes for thirteen years plus the making
of extensive improvements at a cost of over $4,000.00
were not sufficient to constitute adverse possession.
. . . the repairs and improvements were such as
a person in possession would make for one's own
convenience and satisfaction and would not necessarilv show an intent to oust cotenants of their
rights or rebut the presumption that they were
made for the benefit of all the cotenants.
The court once again cited the M cCready case to the
effect that
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.. in order for a tenant to adverne his cotenant
must "bring it home" to his cotenant and br
the most open and notorious aets show to th~
world that ''his possession is intended to exclude,
and does exclude, the rights of his cotrnant."
}w

The foregoing cases have t>stahlished a rule in Utah
that makes adverse possession against a cotenant extremely difficult short of actual ouster of the cotenant
or exprt>ss rPpudiation of the cotenant's titlP. Only one
case has been found in which advrrse possession against
a cotenant has been successful. The decision in that
case, llfotheu.·s r. Baker, 47 Ptah 532, 155 Pac. 427 (1916),
was bast>d upon t>xtraordinary fac.ts. These facts were
qlmted h~- the court from the lower court's findings as
follows:
. the plaintiff ... has been in the continuous.
open, public, and adverse possession of the above
described real estate and has paid all tht> taxef'
and assessments levied against said property continuously since 1886 under claim of title; and that
she has used and occupied said premises continuouslv since 188'9 and made valuable improvement~ thereon of the approximate value of $12,000,
consisting of a five-room cottage of the value of
$3,000, one eight-room cottage of the value of
$5,000, one seven-room house of the value of
$3,000: and that she has expended the sum of
$1,000 in leveling the surface of said ground; that
she built walks, planted shrubbery, constmcted
outbuildings for the covenient use of the occupants of said premises; and that during said period of tinw when she made all of said improve
ments and exprnded said money and labor shr
waR occupying, holding and using said premisrl'
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openly, continuously, publicly and adversely
against all persons whomsoever and against the
claims of all the defendants herein....
Obviously, the extensive improvements made by the
plaintiff in the Mat hews case were the reason for the
Court's decision in favor of the plaintiff. Just as obviously, the facts of the case now before the court are not
sufficient to constitute notice to appellants that respondents were attempting to assert title against them by
adverse possession. The only acts of respondents herein
that might give any kind of notice to appeUants were
the fencing, plowing, planting and grazing of the common land. These acts were held insufficient in the
McCrr>a.dy, Sperry and Heiselt cases discussed supra.
Moreover, the Sperry and Heiselt cases also involved
the making of substan,tial improvements on the property and nevertheless held that adverse possession had
not been established. No improvements of any kind were
ever made upon the property in the instant case and
therefore adverse possession has not been established a
fortiori.
Respondents' possession of the property, payment
of taxes thereon and all of their acts with respect to it
were consistent with their right as tenants in common
to possess and use the whole undivided property. The
presumption that all of this was done for the benefit of
their cotenants has not been overcome in this case.
A tho.rough discussion of adverse possession as between cotenants appears in Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 5 (1962).
The author of that lengthy annotation, after examining
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the more than 1100 cases eitf~d therein, concludes at pages
23-24 that a cotenant may gain title by adverse possession against his cotenant but to do so
... he must show that at tlw timP in question he
was personally, or by tenant or agent, in actual
possession of the premises, or of the particular
and sufficiently defined part of the premises to
which h(' makes claim, that he intended an actual
adverse possession operative as of that time, that
he did in fact hold and claim the premises adversely, and, lastly, that his cotenant or cotenants had
knowledge or notice of that fact.
POINT II.
THE AGREEMENT OF APPELLANT TO ALLOW HIS
COTENANT TO POSSESS THE PROPERTY PRECLUDES
THE ASSERTION OF TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.

ThP discussion to this point has assumed that there
was no agreement between the cotenants as to who would
have possession of the property. In other words, if
respondents had gone into exclusive possession of the
property without permission of appellants and with the
intent of obtaining title by adverse possession against
appellants, their actions with respect to the property
were not sufficient to put appellants on notice of their
intent. Therefore, the fact that respondents went into
possession of the property with appellants' express permission and pursuant to an agreement allowing them to
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do so, makes appellants' case against adverse possession
an even stronger one. Moreover, it is appellants' con-

tention that the agreement precludes respondents' assertion of title by adverse possession. From the very nature
of the agreement respondents' possession was not adverse. It was even more than permissive. It was actually
a landlord-tenant re1'ationship whereunder, for a consideration, exclusive possession was given to one cotenant
by the other. Clearly, under these circumstances, there

can be no· claim of adverse possession.
That such a landlord-tenant relationship can be created between cotenants is supported by 4 THOMPSON,
REAL PROPERTY

1801, at 140 (1961 repl.), stating

~

that " ... the relationship of landlord and tenant may be
created between cotenants involving the passing of exclusive possession to one cotenant." The agreement between Pender and Ehlers 0reated such a relationship
and adverse possession cannot run in favor of a tenant
and against his landlord without notice of such adverse
holding being brought home to the landlord. 3 AM. JUR.

2d Adverse Possesion

~

166 (1962).

The fact that respondents had no knowledge of the
agreement between Pender and Ehlers did not relieve
them of the burden of that agreement. As grantees of
Pender, they stepped into his shoes and obtained no
greater rights to the property than he had. In support
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of this 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPER'TY ~ 1798, at
127 ( l 961 repl.), states that "one tenant in common cannot convey his interest in a portion of the property held
in common to the prejudice of his cotenants, and the
grantee of one of the cotenants steps into the shoes of
his grantor, subject to all the rights of the other cotenants and their successors."
It is significant that respondents in this ciase ob-

tained their interest in the property by quitclaim deeds,
which convey only the "right, title, interest and estate
of the grantor'' and canno,t be relied upon as conveyances of actual title to the property. lTT AH CODE ANN.
~

57-1-13 (1953). Cases have made a distinction between

a conveyance by one cOttenant to a stranger by warranty
deed and by quitclaim deed. If the stranger takes by
warranty deed, he has color of title upon which to base
his adverse holding. But if he takes by quitclaim deed,
he does not. 4 THOMPSON, RE,AL PROPERTY~ 1812,
at 26 (Supp. 1962) Moreover, respondents did not think
that the quitclaim deeds gave them color of title as
against appellants. They recognized appellants' interest
in the property and, by their offer to purchase appellants' intPrest after receiving the quitclaim deeds, indica tPd they wen• not at that time attempting to hokl
adversPly to them.
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Appellant made no attempt to interfere with respondents' possession of the property quite obviously for
two reasons. First, he was relying on the agreement
he had made with Pender. Second, he was aware that
the surest way to convert his, and respondents', tax title
into fee title was to hold adversely to the fee title holders
and to pay taxes on the property for the statutory
period. Respondents were in possession for appellants
as well as themselves since the possession of one cotenant
is the possession of all. One purpose of the agreement
between Pender and Ehlers was to start the adverse possession statute running against the fee title holders. Another purpose was to make certain that one of the cotenan ts would pay the taxes each year. Ehlers checked
the tax records each year to be sure that this part of
the agreement had been fulfilled. Since he found that
the taxes had been paid each year, he could only assume
that Pender had told respondents of his agreement with
Ehlers and that they were possessing the property pursuant to that agreement. Without some kind of notice
to appellants that respondents claimed the property as
their own, repudiating appellants' title, there can be no
claim of adverse posses,sion.

C'ONOLUSION
Under the decided cases in this country and, more
particularly, under the decided cases in the State of

Utah, respondents have not brought home to appellants
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that they were attempting to hold adversely to them.
Fencing, plowing, planting and grazing are acts that
have been held insufficient to put a cotenant on notice
of an adverse holding. Instead they are entirely consistent with holding as tenants in common. Moreover,
the agreement of appellants to allo~w their cotenants to
possess the property exclusively for payment of taxes
precludes any assertion of an adverse holding. Rather
the holding was permissive. This permissive holding continued due to the lack of any ex:press notice to appellants or of acts by respondents that would unquestionably
put appellants on notice. Therefore, the lower court's
decision should be reversed and the case remanded for
an aocounting and for partition.
1
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